In this preliminary study, we proposed a mathematical information sharing model for rival information and simulated the information sharing behaviors in systems confronting the social dilemma. The simulations help us understand the factors that influence the performance of information sharing systems and may lead to new approaches that solve the social dilemma.
Introduction
The development of Web2.0 has seen a wide range of systems in which people create and share information directly with others, such as Wikipedia, Slashdot, and Yahoo Answers.
Whether the users are willing to share information with others is a key factor of the success of these large-scale Web based collaboration systems or services. Many studies have attempted to explain why people voluntarily participate in these collaboration systems. Known theories include anticipated reciprocity, increased recognition, sense of efficacy, and sense of community [1] .
An important characteristic of these systems is that the shared information is mostly "nonrival", which means the information value does not change no matter whether it is owned by one or thousands. However, there is also "rival" information, whose value decreases once it is shared with others, such as a new business idea, or a secret parking spot. The sharing of rival information is rare in these web communities because of the 
Information sharing model
To analyze sharing trends in information-sharing systems confronting the social dilemma, an information sharing model was proposed:
There are two types of information: public information and private information.
Public information is possessed by everyone in the group. Private information is possessed by just one person in the group.
1.
A piece of information has similar value to all individuals. When a piece of information is private to an individual, its value is 1; when the owner shares it with others, its value decreases to (1 -α).
2.
In a group of n individuals, the information flow of individual i is shown in figure 1. 3.
αi is valuable information that individual i retrieves by himself; biis useful information he gets from others; ci is information he shares with others. ci and bi can be calculated as follows:
The payoff to an individual is the profit he derives from the group. The payoff to individual i is:
(3)
We assume that individuals always pursue maximum interests, thus they select actions that bring them profits and avoid actions that make them lose profits. Therefore, to pursue maximum interests, the individuals adjust their βs according to the changes of their payoffs H (k) -H (k-1) and the previous directions dir (k) in which they adjusted βs:
Where μi (k+1) is the pace of the adjustment; ηi (k+1) is a random variable representing uncertainties in the adjustments of βi.
Analysis of sharing trends

Synchronous situation
Firstly, we give the theoretical deduction in a situation where individuals adjust their βs synchronously. Three simplifications are adopted:
The amount of valuable information retrieved by any individual during any period is 1. the same.
There are no uncertainties in adjustment. 2.
Individuals adjust their βs with uniform paces. 3.
Under these simplifications, the change of payoff to individual i is:
For further analysis, equation (6) is given: (6) In this equation, the overall change of β in the group is mi (k) times as much as Δβi (k) . If we use w (k) to represent the number of individuals who increase their βs and use v (k) to represent the number of individuals who decrease their βs, we have:
According to equation (4) and (8), individual i will increase his βi when , and decrease his βi when . This leads to the following deduction: If , then there will not be trends toward sharing in the collaborative group. If , there will be trends to! ward sharing in the collaborative group.
Using some skillful transformations, we can remove these simplifications and have most of our deductions unchanged.
Asynchronous situation
In the deduction in 3.1, mi (k) , the imbalance of the individuals' decisions which occurs when individuals adjust their behaviors simultaneously is the intrinsic impetus of trends toward sharing in the collaborative group. This imbalance will be weakened in asynchronous situations since few people act simultaneously. As a result, there will not be clear trends toward sharing in the asynchronous systems
Simulation
We present results of a simulation with a group of 50 individuals. In the simulation, each individual adjusted his cooperative degree β to pursue the maximum interest. βs took values in the interval of (0,1) and were assigned random values at the beginning of the simulation. The distribution of βs was used as our result after performing a thousand trials.
The simulation was repeated for three different values of α (0.5,0.9,0.99). 
Conclusion
This poster presents an effort to understand the sharing of rival information in a group. The theoretical deduction and the simulations suggest that sharing trends may appear more easily in synchronous situations than asynchronous situations. In asynchronous situations, which is the case for most online information sharing systems, more incentive mechanism are needed to foster sharing of rival information. The current information sharing model is still preliminary. Future work will focus on refining the model with findings from empirical studies on information sharing behaviors.
